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Weak Law v. Strong Ties: An Empirical Study of Business 
Investment, Law and Political Connections in China 
 
Wei Zhang* 
(Singapore Management University) 
Ji Li**  
(Rutgers University) 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on a large-scale survey of Chinese entrepreneurs, our study 
explores how legal and political institutions influence investment 
decisions made by private companies. The study finds that, consistent 
with the conventional view, a more effective legal system is correlated 
with short-term general investment, and that the judiciary is important 
mainly because of its restraint over the state. The role of effective 
courts, however, diminishes when private entrepreneurs consider 
making long-term investment. We find a positive association between 
the entrepreneurs’ political backgrounds and their R&D investment, 
suggesting that Chinese courts, in spite of decades of reform, are not yet 
viewed as reliable to protect long-term private investment from 
expropriation, policy instability, and a hostile regulatory environment. 
Rather, informal political connections constitute the premise for the 
protection of long-term investment. We also find evidence indicating 
that political ties are expensive resources to accumulate and maintain, 
so Chinese entrepreneurs tap into them only when substantial long-term 
interests are at stake. The findings contribute to the literature on law 
and economic development. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
What policies and institutions alleviate poverty?  How can poor countries 
catch up and enjoy the prosperity the developed world has long taken for granted?  
Such questions have remained in the center of academic inquiries worldwide.  
And most of the prescribed solutions can find their root in the law and 
development literature.  For decades scholars and practitioners have held a highly 
deterministic view about the relationship between law and development, i.e., the 
rule of law is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth.  Though the 
specifics vary, the common theme holds constant: comprehensive laws and an 
effective legal system are essential for economic institutions such as security of 
property rights and enforceability of contracts, which constitute the bases for 
investment and economic growth (Coase 1960; Williamson 1985; North 1990).  
This conventional view has spawned a great deal of policy advice for political 
and legal reforms in developing countries.  Governments of developing countries 
were told to invest heavily in improving formal laws and the judiciary, in 
particular laws that protect private property and enforce contracts. 1   The 
conventional view, though theoretically robust and empirically supported 
(Torstensson 1994; Keefer and Knack 1997; Johnson, McMillan et al. 2000; Field 
2005), has come under attack.  The alleged importance of formal institutions, for 
instance, has been scrutinized.  Informal institutions such as social networks and 
social norms are argued to be substitute for formal courts in protecting property 
rights, encouraging investments, and facilitating sustainable economic growth 
(McMillan and Woodruff 1999; Wang 2001; Davis and Trebilcock 2008).  In 
addition, formal institutions are of different value to investment and economic 
growth.  The effects of access to market financing, it has been shown, are 
contingent on secure property rights (Johnson, McMillan et al. 2000; Johnson, 
McMillan et al. 2002). The causal relationship between investment and property 
rights has also been re-examined more closely.  Evidence from less developed 
regions suggests that claims of private property rights strengthen as a result of 
increased investment, reflecting the endogeneity of the rights factor (Besley 1995; 
Brasselle, Gaspart et al. 2002).  
Recent scholarship that explores the relationship between law and growth has 
shifted the focus to political variables to explain the emergence and functioning of 
developmental economic institutions.  Formal property laws and efficient and 
independent courts do not emerge from thin air, and having a sophisticated statute 
in the book is no guarantee of its effective enforcement.  In other words, the 
efficacy of formal laws depends on a set of formal and informal institutional 
factors, which are ultimately determined by political institutions that empower 
groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, impose effective 
                                                        
1 Such policies have been incorporated in the well-known policy bundle called the Washington Consensus. 
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restraints on power-holders, and reduce rents to be captured by power-holders 
(Weingast and North 1989; Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2005; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012). Political institutions are in turn shaped by the power distribution 
among de jure and de facto power-holders (Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2005). Law 
and other formal institutions continue to be relevant, but as endogenous variables 
that may affect de jure power, power distribution between de jure and de facto 
power-holders, and the process of institutionalizing the latter’s interests.  
To scholars who have followed closely the development of East Asian 
countries, law and other formal legal institutions play at best a marginal role.  The 
developmental state literature highlights the important role of the government in 
forming industrial policies, assisting economic restructuring, and nurturing 
competitive national companies (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999; Wade 2004). 
Law and formal legal institutions are rarely prioritized in the process.  As a matter 
of fact, elements of a “modern” legal system are considered a nuisance and 
intentionally kept in check (Davis and Trebilcock 2008).  Certain empirical re-
examination also suggests that positive changes in institutions should be 
interpreted as outcomes of economic growth (Glaeser, La Porta et al. 2004).      
China features prominently in many of the works on law and development.  
Apparently, China has achieved remarkable growth without having first 
established the rule of law or a solid institutional structure in general.  
Development economists and political scientists have launched an extended 
debate over the institutional foundation supportive of China’s giant leap in 
economic growth in the past decades (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian & Weigngast 
1997; Qian & Roland 1998; Cai & Treisman 2006; Huang 2008).  More recently, 
a group of scholars empirically tested the applicability of the rights hypothesis in 
China that highlights the essential role of a well-functioning legal system in 
significant economic growth.  Most of their findings appear consistent with this 
hypothesis in that the quality of the judiciary in protecting property rights is 
ascertained as positively correlated with firms’ investment incentives, either 
generally or particularly with respect to R&D (Cull & Xu 2005; Long 2010; Lin 
et al. 2010).  On the other hand, there are also studies presenting suspicion on the 
effectiveness of the formal legal system on China’s economic growth in the years 
of “Reform and Opening-up”, especially in the private sector (Allen et al. 2005; 
Clark et al. 2008).  Hence, it seems that the conclusion of this intellectual debate 
still awaits more intensive exploration into the institutional settings, both formal 
and informal, underlying China’s economic miracle. 
One important informal institution in China that has allegedly provided 
security to investment is good political connections (Xin and Pearce 1996; Chen 
2002; Dickson 2007; Li and Zhang 2007).  In an environment lacking rule of law, 
close partnership with political power-holders not only prevents expropriation or 
any other overly predatory actions, but also generates numerous privileges (Wank 
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1996; Chen 2002).  Such partnership may be purchased by gifts and bribes (Xin 
and Pearce 1996; Chen 2002; Deng and Kennedy 2010; Fang, Cai et al. 2011), but 
stronger ones are usually built through long-term interactions in more complex 
settings.  In the heydays of the economic reform, the state encouraged party 
cadres to “jump into the sea (xiahai)” and become entrepreneurs.  Many former 
party officials who had been managers of state-owned enterprises also 
metamorphosed into private entrepreneurs through the massive privatization 
programs (Dickson 2007). These entrepreneurs with political backgrounds, or red 
capitalists, are ardent supporters of the current regime (Chen and Dickson 2008).  
Of course, the support is not one-directional.  Under the pressure to deliver 
economic growth, the government has also adapted to the needs of the 
entrepreneurs (Tsai 2007; Deng and Kennedy 2010).  But extant literature has not 
shown whether the alleged benefits from the political connections are translated 
into elevated motivations for business growth and whether red capitalists put their 
money where their mouth is, i.e., making more long-term investments, a telling 
sign of confidence in the regime’s future.  This paper intends to fill the gap by 
looking into the implication of entrepreneurs’ political connections for their 
investment decisions.  
To be more specific, we empirically evaluate the hypothesis that variation in 
judicial quality in China explains differences in short-term investments that 
generates short-term return, and finds affirming evidence.  But given the limit of 
legal protection for property rights, we posit that long-term investments depend 
on costly informal institutions.  The test of this hypothesis clearly links the effect 
of variation in Chinese business-owners’ political connections to their R&D 
investments that generally produces long-term return.  
This article contributes to the law and development literature by adding 
another piece of empirical evidence to a central question of the literature, namely, 
the relationship between the institutions and investment, in an economy of 
continuing scholarly interest.  It looks broadly at both the formal legal system and 
the informal political ties built by Chinese entrepreneurs. It also proposes a more 
nuanced understanding of the effect of property rights security on business 
investment in the Chinese context that underscores the interaction of a variety of 
institutional mechanisms. 
  
 
2. DATA 
 
2.1. DATA SOURCE 
 
This study is mainly drawn on the national private enterprise survey 
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conducted by a number of research institutes and government agencies.2  This is 
one of those enterprise surveys carried out periodically across administrative 
regions and industrial sectors, using the multi-stage stratified random sampling 
strategy.3  All the surveyed private enterprises are owned by Chinese citizens.  
These surveys have been widely used by economists, sociologists and political 
scientists to study entrepreneurship in China (Yang 2007; Huang 2008; Li et al. 
2008).  The data of the dependent variables and most independent variables in our 
paper are derived from the 2002 survey.4 
The 2002 survey is selected for two reasons.  On the one hand, this survey 
covers roughly the same time period as the data sets used in the previous research, 
rendering the results more comparable temporally. 5   On the other, the 
questionnaire structure, as well as coding methods of the national private 
enterprise surveys, also leaves the 2002 survey the most reliable candidate for this 
research.6  First, with respect to the entrepreneurs’ choices of dispute resolution 
methods, the structure of the relevant survey questions changed after 2000.  While 
the 1995-2000 surveys asked the entrepreneurs to indicate their most preferred 
method, the 2002-2006 surveys directed them to pick the methods that are usually 
used.  In addition, the earlier surveys did not record the entrepreneurs’ most 
preferred options separately for ordinary and administrative disputes as the later 
surveys did for their usually selected dispute resolution methods.  The 2004 and 
2006 surveys, however, embodied some special coding rules that make it hard to 
interpret the data.7  Hence, they are not used for this research to avoid potential 
                                                        
2 The list includes the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, All-
China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, and the Chinese Society of Private Economy at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
3 The earliest private enterprise survey was conducted in 1991 and the most recent in 2012. As of 
November 2013, the survey data are available for public use at the Universities Service Center for 
China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong for the years of 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012.  However, method of dispute resolution, the variable of 
our primary interest, does not appear in the last two survey instruments. 
4
 Unlike the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys, the main data source of earlier studies, the 
private enterprise surveys target only at the private firms solely or predominantly owned by 
individuals (siying qiye).  State or collectively owned enterprises, therefore, are not included in our 
sample.  Moreover, the private enterprise surveys cover firms in urban as well as rural areas 
whereas the World Bank surveys collect data merely from urban areas.  In short, compared to the 
existing studies, our current research employs a sample that is more inclusive geographically but 
less heterogeneous in terms of ownership structure. 
5 The 2002 survey reports the states of Chinese private enterprises in 2001.  Long (2010) used the 
World Bank’s 2001 Investment Climate Survey collecting information on Chinese firms as of 
2000, while Cull & Xu (2005) and Lin et al. (2010) both relied on the World Bank survey 
conducted in early 2003 covering the period between 2000 and 2002. 
6 The response rate of the 2002 survey is 89.6%. 
7 In particular, according to the coding rules of the 2004 survey, instead of being asked to choose 
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measurement errors.  Apart from the issues in the explanatory variables, the 2002 
survey also provides a clearer measurement of one of the dependent variables 
since it asked directly about the total amount of general investment rather than the 
amount of reinvestment from net profits as the 2004 and 2006 surveys did.  There 
is evidence that some respondents might not be aware of the limitation set in the 
two later surveys as a substantial number of entrepreneurs reported reinvestment 
amounts exceeding the net profits.  This potential inconsistency in responses again 
causes concerns of measurement errors.8 
The private enterprise survey was complemented by data from the China 
Statistical Yearbooks (CSY) compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, and the marketization index constructed by the National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI).  These are the data sources of the contextual controls, 
the per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the proportion of lawyers in local 
population, and the marketization index of Chinese provinces. 
 
2.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variables of this research are measures of the private firms’ 
investment incentives.  The 2002 private enterprise survey has two questions 
recording the amount of investments in general and R&D investments in 
particular made by the surveyed firms in 2001.  The first question asks about the 
amount of investment newly made in 2001 as part of the firm’s general 
expenditure whereas the second inquires into the amount of R&D investment 
made by the firm in 2001 to develop new products, technologies, or projects.  
Based on these records, we construct two dummy variables and two continuous 
                                                                                                                                                       
the desired resolution methods for each type of disputes, the surveyed entrepreneurs were probably 
guided to pick one from the two types of disputes, ordinary and administrative, for which they 
employed a particular resolution method more frequently.  In other words, rather than comparing 
their preferences among different methods of resolution for a certain type of dispute, respondents 
were comparing their inclination to use a given method of resolution with respect to the two 
different types of disputes.  In this case, a respondent could be led to choose a dispute type for 
which she was less unwilling to use the given method even if she, as a matter of fact, was reluctant 
to rely on this method for the resolution of either type of disputes.  Consequently, in 2004, there 
might exist an upward biased tendency to choose each dispute resolution method.  On the other 
hand, although the 2006 survey allowed the respondents to select as many methods of resolution 
as they wished for each type of disputes from the listed options, its coding rules required the 
surveyors to randomly pick four options chosen by the respondents for consideration.  This coding 
approach is likely to introduce unidentifiable noises to the data. 
8 8 observations are dropped from the 2002 survey sample for possible erroneous information 
about entrepreneurs’ ages.  According to the information contained in these observations, the 
entrepreneurs started their businesses under the age of 16 with some as young as age 7.  The 
Chinese law requires individuals to be at least 16 years old to form a business entity (General 
Principles of the Civil Law, Art. 11).  We also dropped another 5 observations which report a net 
profit even higher than the total sales revenue in 2001. 
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variables to measure the firms’ general and R&D investment incentives.  The two 
dummies, DIN and DRD, equal 1 if a firm made positive general and R&D 
investments respectively.  The continuous variables are the amounts of general 
and R&D investments as percentages of total sales revenue (INOR and RDOR).  
To reduce the skewness and nonnormality of the data, we made logarithmic 
transformations for the continuous variables (Cameron & Trivedi 2009).9 
 
2.3. QUALITY OF COURTS  
 
Court quality is of our primary interest in this study.  The private enterprise 
surveys ask how the entrepreneurs usually went about resolving business-related 
disputes.  One of the options provided by the survey questions is litigation or 
arbitration.10  Although this option combines litigation and arbitration we believe 
that selection of this option reveals predominantly an entrepreneur’s use of courts, 
considering the very infrequent uses of arbitration in China.  Generally speaking, 
arbitration is but an insignificant means of dispute resolution for domestic firms in 
light of the enormous number of disputes resolved through litigation or mediation 
(Peerenboom & He 2009: 28).  There is evidence showing that most domestic 
Chinese firms in Shanghai had little awareness or understanding of the potential 
role of arbitration (Clarke et al. 2008: 410).  If this finding is representative,11 it is 
quite likely that Chinese private entrepreneurs have in mind litigation rather than 
arbitration when they choose such an option merging these two.  According to a 
World Bank survey, as of 2001, only 12% of the firms having disputes used 
arbitration even once and only 2% used it to resolve disputes at least half of the 
time (Clarke et al. 2008: 410).  Taking contract cases as an example, in the year of 
2005, the total number of cases resolved by arbitration was only 1.91% of that of 
the cases accepted by the trial courts (Chen 2010: 11).  All these statistics support 
                                                        
9 In the log transformation, we set all zero percentage values to an amount slightly smaller (by 
0.0000001) than the minimum transformed log value of a positive percentage value.  After 
transformation, the data are almost symmetrically distributed and have negligible nonnormal 
kurtosis.  We construct two additional variables equaling the amounts of general and R&D 
investments as percentages of a firm’s total asset (INOA and RDOA), subject also to the 
logarithmic transformation, to test the robustness of the findings. 
10 In the 2002 survey, the other listed options are: 1) quiet endurance; 2) negotiation; 3) petition to 
government agencies; 4) petition to delegates of the people’s congresses or the people’s political 
consultative conferences; 5) resolution through the Federation of Industry and Commerce or 
private enterprise associations; 6) seeking support from Party or government leaders through 
personal connections; 7) private mediation; 8) resolution through spontaneously formed unions; 
and 9) resorting to the mass media. 
11 Considering the more sophisticated knowledge base of citizens in Shanghai than that of those 
living in other parts of the country (Gechlik 2005), the evidence presented above may actually be 
the upper-bound of the general awareness of arbitration among Chinese. 
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the idea that Chinese entrepreneurs rarely submit their disputes to arbitration.12 
How likely firms will resolve their disputes through litigation has often been 
employed as a measure of the quality of the formal legal system in protection of 
private property rights (Cull & Xu 2005; Long 2010).  As rational market agents, 
private enterprises choose to resolve disputes through litigation because they have 
certain trust that courts are effective in redressing their grievances relative to the 
alternative mechanisms.  The frequency of court usage is indicative of both the 
efficiency and fairness of the legal system.  Especially, since the survey question 
asks about the dispute resolution methods usually relied on by the entrepreneurs, 
the repeated uses of courts should not be merely a result of the uninformed 
optimism about judicial performance in China by nonusers as reported in some 
previous studies (e.g. Gallagher & Wang 2011). 
In the 2002 private enterprise survey, entrepreneurs could choose different 
options regarding ordinary, or civil, disputes and disputes with administrative 
agencies. 13   This additional information presents us with a unique chance to 
distinguish the effects of the formal legal system on private investment incentives 
in two different aspects, namely, offering state-sanctioned remedies to a private 
party whose rights are violated by another private party, and constraining the 
encroachment on private rights by the state itself.14  It has long been posited that 
both are essential dimensions of formal protection of property rights (Weingast 
1995; Levine 2005).  
Specifically, following Long (2010), we construct four variables to measure 
the court quality faced by a particular private firm in China.  Two of these 
variables record the percentages of entrepreneurs in a given industry and a given 
province who regularly resolve ordinary and administrative disputes, respectively, 
through courts (quality of local courts).  The other two are the percentages of 
entrepreneurs in the same industry but in all other provinces who usually choose 
                                                        
12 These remarks are made for civil disputes.  As far as administrative disputes are concerned, 
arbitration is not available in practice, thus the option of “litigation or arbitration” simply means 
litigation. 
13 According to the 2002 survey handbook, ordinary disputes referred to those occurring “between 
one private enterprise and another private enterprise, consumers, or suppliers”, essentially an 
equivalent to civil disputes. 
14 In China, administrative law refers mainly to the body of statues and regulations aimed at 
reining in government officials, providing remedies to victims of official malfeasance, and 
resolving disputes between citizens and government agents. Since its formal establishment marked 
by the enactment of the PRC Administrative Litigation Law in 1989, the regime has developed at a 
fast pace.  In 2013 Chinese trial courts adjudicated more than 150,000 administrative cases. The 
numerical growth, however, does not tell the whole story of suing government officials in China. 
Positing relatively low in the power hierarchy, Chinese courts tend to be biased in favor of 
defendant government agencies. Anticipating the bias, many avoid litigating against the state; 
hence the overall low per capita rate of administrative lawsuits. That said, significant variation 
exists across regions and over time (Li 2013). 
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to litigate, respectively, ordinary and administrative disputes (quality of nonlocal 
courts).  As argued by Long (2010: 636-37), the province-industry level 
aggregation is conceptually solid since the quality of the court system should be 
measured at a level more aggregate than that of a firm, and overcomes the 
potential simultaneity problem.  The province-industry averages remove the 
endogeneity problem resulting from unobservables correlated with the 
explanatory variables at the firm, but not the province-industry, level (Lin et al. 
2010).  In our case, in particular, at the firm level, the frequency of litigation may 
be affected by such unobserved factors as legal knowledge held by the owner, but 
they are less likely to determine the litigation propensity across a province and 
industry sector.  In addition, the province-industry averages are believed to 
mitigate the effects of measurement error as well (Fisman & Svensson 2007). 
 
2.4. POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
 
Entrepreneurs’ political connections is another factor that may influence their 
investment incentives in China.  Unlike listed companies whose management and 
shareholder information is held public, it is usually impossible to identify a 
private company’s political connections by counting the number of politicians 
being its top officers or large shareholders (e.g. Faccio 2006, Firth et al. 2011) as 
such information is not easily obtainable.  Instead, political ties were measured in 
several other ways in the previous studies on Chinese private enterprises.  Li et al. 
(2008) used the Communist Party of China (CCP) membership as the indicator of 
political connections whereas Ang & Jia (2011) used prior employment by the 
Party, state, or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as well as seats in the people’s 
congresses (PCs) or people’s political consultative conferences (PPCCs) to proxy 
the better politically connected entrepreneurs.  Cadre status is another measure of 
political connections in the literature (e.g. Michelson 2007). 
We believe that an entrepreneur’s status as a cadre in the communist 
nomenklatura prior to her engagement in entrepreneurship is a good proxy of 
political connections for it not only measures the entrepreneur’s initial endowment 
of political capital, hence alleviating the concern about endogeneity, but may also 
be second only to PC / PPCC positions in terms of its restrictiveness among the 
various proxies of political connections used in the previous studies,15 thus better 
capturing the elitist nature of the political haves in China.16  This being said, we 
                                                        
15 But unlike prior cadre status, the proxy of PC / PPCC positions is likely to suffer from the 
endogeneity problem.  It is now well-known that the Chinese party-state has been escalating 
efforts to recruit private entrepreneurs, especially the successful ones, to the Party and the formal 
political institutions such as PC and PPCC (Dickson 2003: 89-115, 2008: 66-100, 167-198). 
16 There were as many as 74 million SOE employees, not including the Party and state institution 
employees, in 2001 (CSY 2002).  The number of the CCP members was about 67 million in 2002 
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2011).  On the other hand, in the year of 2003, the number 
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use all the other three proxies of political connections, prior Party, state or SOE 
employment, PC or PPCC positions, and CCP membership, as alternative 
measures of political connections to test the robustness of our findings. 
With respect to prior cadre status, we construct a dummy variable that equals 
1 if an entrepreneur had previous experience as 1) a cadre in the Party or state 
institution, or 2) a person in charge of an SOE, and 0 otherwise.  The reason why 
SOE leaders are deemed as cadres is that they are appointed by the Party 
committees at the higher levels, just like officials in other public institutions, so 
are part of the communist nomenklatura indeed (Wu 2005: 140; Naughton 2007: 
317).17  As for the other three indicators of political connections, we draw data 
directly from the 2002 private enterprise survey questions asking about 
entrepreneurs’ previous working experiences, PC or PPCC positions and CCP 
membership, although we count an entrepreneur as a CCP member only if she 
joined CCP before starting the entrepreneurial endeavors.  Therefore, except the 
PC or PPCC delegation, all these proxies indicate entrepreneurs’ initial 
endowment of political connections. 
 
2.5. CONTROLS 
 
The baseline model controls a series of attributes of owners18 and firms.  The 
owner’s attributes include gender, 19  education level, 20  age, and years of 
management experience in logarithm.21  The firm’s attributes under control are the 
firm’s age in logarithm, return on sales in 2001,22 number of full-time employees 
                                                                                                                                                       
of cadres is estimated to be approximately 40 million though the definition of cadres used for this 
estimation is still broader than the one used in our research (Li 2005). 
17 Furthermore, in coding the cadre status, we do not include the village leaders in the rural areas.  
Direct election of officials of village committees (VCs) first emerged in the late 1980s.  Since 
1998, it has become popular for villagers to nominate candidates directly.  Multi-candidate 
competitive elections have become the norm, and candidates in most places are now given 
opportunities to deliver speeches or engage in other forms of campaigning (O’Brien & Han 2009).  
It is thus fair to say that, compared with other essentially unelected cadres, these elected village 
leaders are more often outsiders of the nomenklatura and less tied to the official power structure.  
However, in robustness tests, we also code cadre status alternatively to include village cadres. 
18 We use the terms “owner” and “entrepreneur” alternatively in this paper, referring to the survey 
respondent identified as the founder and the person in charge of the firm covered by the survey, 
although the actual proportion of equity ownership held by the owner or entrepreneur varies across 
firms.  
19 Gender is represented by a dummy variable with the value for male being 1. 
20 Education level is classified into elementary school, secondary school, high school, college, and 
postgraduate degrees, coded respectively from 1 to 5. 
21  Management experience is calculated according to the respondents’ answers to the survey 
question “In which year did you start your own business management work?”. 
22 This is calculated as the net profit divided by the sales revenue. 
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in logarithm in 2001, access to bank loans,23 industrial sector,24 and headquarters 
location. 25   Most of these are controls widely seen in existing studies.  In 
particular, a firm’s access to bank loans, return on sales, and firm size as proxied 
by the number of employees have been found to be positively correlated with its 
spending on general or R&D investment (Cull & Xu 2005; Lin et al. 2010) 
whereas firm age is reported to be negatively associated with R&D investments 
(Lin et al. 2010). 
Unlike some earlier studies (Long 2010; Cull & Xu 2005; Lin et al. 2010), we 
do not control in the baseline specifications whether a firm is a private firm or the 
percentage of private ownership in the firm since the private enterprise surveys 
cover only private firms.  We do include in the robustness tests, however, the 
percentage of the entrepreneur’s ownership in the firm.  In addition, our baseline 
models do not include the percentage of informal payments made to government 
officials as the private enterprise surveys do not ask entrepreneurs to make such 
an estimate like the World Bank surveys did.  Instead, we add the amount of 
informal charges (tanpai) as a percentage of sales revenue paid to the government 
as a proxy of government expropriation in the robustness tests.    
Apart from the features of owners and firms, we also include in the baseline 
regressions three provincial level contextual variables, the natural logarithm of the 
provincial per capita Gross Domestic Product, the index showing the proportion 
of lawyers in local population (lawyer index), and the marketization index of each 
province in 2001.  Per capita GDP controls the level of economic development.  
The lawyer index is a proxy for the relative availability of legal knowledge and 
legal service, which is another important aspect of the legal environment faced by 
entrepreneurs in China. Finally, the marketization index measures the relative 
progress of each province in its transition to the market economy.26  We do not 
include the province dummies in the baseline models with these province level 
variables because of the multicollinearity problem.27  As reported in the appendix, 
                                                        
23 A dummy variable is constructed and equals 1 if the firm had an outstanding bank loan in 2001.  
24  Industrial sectors are a series of dummies representing 15 sectors listed in the survey: 1) 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing; 2) mining; 3) manufacturing; 4) power and 
gas; 5) construction; 6) geology and hydraulics; 7) transportation; 8) retail and restaurants; 9) 
finance and insurance; 10) real estate; 11) social services; 12) public health and sports; 13) 
education and culture; 14) science and technology; 15) others.  The coding of industrial sectors is 
based on the firm’s primary business operation.  Unlike the 2004 and 2006 surveys, the 2002 
survey allows each firm to pick only one primary industry sector. 
25  Headquarters locations are also represented by a series of dummy variables respectively 
representing: 1) major cities; 2) medium / small cities; 3) townships; 4) rural areas; and 5) 
economic development zones. 
26 For the details about the construction of the lawyer index and the marketization index, see Fan et 
al. (2006).  The data of these two indexes are based on Fan et al. (2006). 
27 Province dummies are included in alternative specifications without the province-level controls 
for robustness tests. 
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except those between the three provincial level contextual variables, the 
correlations between most independent variables are low. 
We employ the probit model as the baseline specification to evaluate the 
potential effects of court quality and political connections on entrepreneurs’ 
likelihood of investment.  The probability function of making investments, either 
generally or in R&D, can be expressed as follows: 
 
Pr (investment dummy = 1) = f (Xβ)     (1) 
= f (quality of courts, political connections, owner attributes, firm attributes, 
contextual controls) 
 
where f () is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) in the 
probit model. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of the main variables used for this 
research.  As we can see, although above three quarters of the firms that 
responded to the survey question made new investment in 2001, only less than a 
half of them invested in R&D.28  Judged by firm owners’ likelihood to litigate 
their disputes, the quality of Chinese courts is much worse in adjudicating 
administrative cases than in deciding ordinary civil cases.  Overall, about 25% 
entrepreneurs use courts regularly to resolve civil disputes, slightly higher than 
the World Bank’s estimate of 20% (Long 2010).  But when it comes to 
administrative disputes, merely 5% entrepreneurs would usually rely on courts for 
resolution.  Roughly 40% entrepreneurs in the sample used to be cadres, much 
higher than the rate of cadres in the general population.  It seems that political 
elites are more likely to become entrepreneurs in China, at least at the beginning 
of this century. 
With respect to other owner characteristics, Chinese entrepreneurs are 
predominantly male, accounting for nearly 90% of the respondents.  An average 
entrepreneur in the sample received a high-school-level education, apparently 
higher than the general population.29  The average age of entrepreneurs was about 
44 years old, which is consistent with the studies showing that entrepreneurship is 
concentrated among individuals in mid-career and that the probability of being or 
                                                        
28 Although not reported in Table 1, when viewed as a percentage of total sales revenue, the 
average rate of R&D investment (8.45%) is also much lower than the average rate of general 
investment (28.10%). 
29 In 2003, for example, about 33% of the population aged 6 and above had elementary-school-
level education, and another 38% received secondary-school-level education, whereas those who 
completed high-school-or-higher-level education accounted for 19% (CSY 2003). 
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becoming an entrepreneur increases up to early fifties (Parker 2009: 114).  On 
average, a Chinese entrepreneur covered by the survey has more than 10 years’ 
experience in business management.  
As far as the firm attributes are concerned, the mean age of the surveyed 
private enterprises is slightly above 8 years, suggesting private entrepreneurship is 
a relatively new phenomenon in the three-decade era of China’s “Reform and 
Opening-up”.  The return on sales of an average Chinese private firm is 7.6%, a 
rather low standard compared to other transition economies.  Johnson et al. (2002: 
1342) report that, in 1996, the average return on sales rate of private 
manufacturing firms was 9.9% in Poland, 12.9% in Romania, 20.6% in Russia, 
and 18% in Ukraine.  In 2001, Chinese private firms were doing better only than 
the Slovakian firms in 1996, which received an average return on sales of 5.7%.  
The average number of full-time employees in the surveyed firms is about 150, 
but with a tremendous variation.  Finally, roughly 45% of the private enterprises 
in our sample borrowed bank loans as of the end of 2001.  This is much higher 
than the World Bank survey data, about 25%, reported in the previous studies 
(Cull & Xu 2005: 126; Lin et al. 2010: 52).30   
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
                                                        
30
 As the summary statistics (Table 1) shows, there are more missing data for the variables of 
general investment than R&D investment.  This also seems to be the case in the World Bank 
surveys. For instance, in the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey, the variable of firms’ 
general reinvestment rate has substantially more missing data than the one of firms’ R&D 
expenditure.  The 2001 World Bank Investment Climate Survey used in Long (2010) also appears 
to have a higher percentage of missing data about firms’ general investment rate than new product 
development. The surveyed entrepreneurs or managers in China may be less willing to disclose the 
firm’s overall investment scale than its R&D expenditure as the former might be more sensitive 
information leading to easier estimation of a firm’s financial state by its competitors. 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
General investment decision dummy 2682 0.784 0.412 0 1 
R&D investment decision dummy 3149 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Log general investment intensity 2480 -3.882 3.688 -10.626 3.912 
Log R&D investment intensity 2835 -7.909 4.503 -11.857 2.996 
Quality of local court (ordinary) 3078 0.259 0.155 0 1 
Quality of local court (administrative) 3078 0.049 0.098 0 1 
Quality of nonlocal court (ordinary) 3082 0.258 0.053 0.109 0.4 
Quality of nonlocal court (administrative) 3082 0.050 0.016 0 0.118 
Cadre status dummy 3130 0.389 0.488 0 1 
Owner’s gender dummy 3240 0.888 0.315 0 1 
Owner’s education level 3238 3.212 0.864 1 5 
Owner’s age 3210 43.966 8.049 22 76 
Log owner’s management experience 3225 2.249 0.647 0 3.584 
 14 
Note.  General investment decision dummy takes on value 1 if the firm made positive investment 
in 2001, and 0 otherwise.  R&D investment decision dummy takes on value 1 if the firm made 
positive R&D investment in 2001, and 0 otherwise.  Log general investment intensity is the natural 
logarithm of the amount of investment as a percentage of sales revenue.  Log R&D investment 
intensity is the natural logarithm of the amount of R&D investment as a percentage of sales 
revenue.  Quality of local court (ordinary) is the percentage of firms using courts as a usual 
method to resolve ordinary disputes in the same industry and province.  Quality of local court 
(administrative) is the percentage of firms using courts as a usual method to resolve administrative 
disputes in the same industry and province.  Quality of nonlocal court (ordinary) is the percentage 
of firms using courts as a usual method to resolve ordinary disputes in the same industry but all 
other provinces.  Quality of nonlocal court (administrative) is the percentage of firms using courts 
as a usual method to resolve administrative disputes in the same industry but all other provinces.  
Cadre status dummy takes on value 1 if the entrepreneur used to be a cadre in Party or state 
institutions, or a leader of an SOE, and 0 otherwise.  Owner’s gender dummy takes on value 1 if 
the entrepreneur is male, and 0 if female.  Owner’s education level equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 if her 
highest educational experience is, respectively, elementary school, secondary school, high school, 
college, or postgraduate education.  Owner’s age is the entrepreneur’s age as of 2002.  Log 
owner’s management experience is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
entrepreneur started her business management as of 2002.  Log firm’s age is the natural logarithm 
of the number of years since the firm was established as of 2002.  Return on sales is the ratio of 
net profit to sales revenue in 2001.  Log employee number is the natural logarithm of the number 
of full-time employees.  Access to bank loan dummy takes on value 1 if the firm had an 
outstanding bank loan at the end of 2001.  Log per capita GDP is the natural logarithm of the 
provincial per capita GDP based on CYS 2002.  Lawyer index measures the provincial proportion 
of lawyers in the population based on Fan et al. (2006).  Marketization index measures the 
provincial progress in transition to market economy based on Fan et al. (2006). 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 BASE RESULTS 
 
3.1.1 GENERAL INVESTMENT DECISION 
We first estimate probit regression models using the general investment 
decision dummy as the dependent variable.  In the baseline specifications with 
various measures of owners’ political connections (Table 2), while the quality of 
local courts in deciding ordinary disputes does not influence entrepreneurs’ 
investment decisions, the quality of local courts in adjudicating administrative 
disputes is positively associated with this decision, and is significant at 5% level.  
Log firm’s age 3145 1.927 0.585 0 3.332 
Return on sales 2653 0.076 0.126 -3.190 1 
Log employee number 3194 4.132 1.331 0 8.294 
Access to bank loan dummy 3147 0.446 0.497 0 1 
Log per capita GDP 3245 0.049 0.587 -1.253 1.121 
Lawyer index 3245 3.085 3.092 -0.33 10 
Marketization index 3245 5.794 1.680 0.33 8.18 
 15 
We use former cadre status as the proxy of political connections to estimate the 
magnitude of the influence of local court quality with respect to administrative 
cases.31  For a firm most frequently seen in the sample with a noncadre male 
owner, without access to bank loans, headquartered in a medium or small city, and 
in the manufacturing industry, as the value of the local court quality in 
administrative adjudication increases by one standard deviation from its mean 
while all the other variables are held at their mean values, the firm’s probability to 
make a positive investment decision increases by 2.5 percentage points (or 
22.6%).32 
On the other hand, neither of the two measures of nonlocal court quality has a 
significant effect on general investment decision.  Also, owners’ political 
connections seem to be irrelevant to such a decision, either.  Other variables with 
significant effects on the general investment decision include the owner’s age, 
firm size as measured by the number of employees, firm’s access to bank loans, 
and the per capita GDP at the provincial level.  The effects of firm size and access 
to bank loans are positive, which appears to be consistent with previous findings 
(Lin et al. 2010).  The owner’s age has a negative effect on investment decisions, 
suggesting older entrepreneurs tend to be more conservative in making 
investments.  Somewhat surprisingly, the local economic development level is 
associated negatively with the general investment decision.  This might be a 
reflection of the stricter pecking order among Chinese firms of different 
ownerships in the richer areas that brings about more prejudiced regulatory and 
financial environments against private enterprises (Huang 2003, 2008).  Finally, 
when the values of all variables are held at their means, the probability for a firm 
to make a positive amount of investment is 82.35%, confirming our finding in the 
summary statistics that the vast majority of Chinese private firms did make some 
investment in 2001.   
 
Table 2 Probit Regressions of General Investment Decision: Base Results 
                                                        
31 The estimates are made using the –prchange- command in Stata developed by Long & Freese 
(2006). 
32 For such a firm, its probability to make a positive general investment is 11.07% when faced with 
a local court of mean quality in administrative adjudication.  4.6% of the firms will usually litigate 
administrative disputes in such a court.  One standard deviation of the local court quality 
(administrative), measured by the percentage of firms usually litigating administrative disputes, is 
9.5%. 
 Dependent Variable: DIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
0.016 
(0.383) 
0.016 
(0.380) 
0.014 
(0.386) 
-0.026 
(0.388) 
Quality of Local 1.295** 1.295** 1.428** 1.358** 
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Court 
(administrative) 
(0.605) (0.605) (0.597) (0.586) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
-2.221 
(5.289) 
-2.024 
(5.321) 
-1.685 
(5.243) 
-1.540 
(5.274) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
15.130 
(11.130) 
14.372 
(11.073) 
16.013 
(10.842) 
15.720 
(10.768) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
0.049 
(0.072) 
   
Former 
Government 
Employee 
 
0.034 
(0.089) 
  
PC / PPCC 
Delegates 
  
-0.076 
(0.070) 
 
CCP Member    
0.046 
(0.093) 
Owner’s Attributes 
Gender 
0.086 
(0.108) 
0.092 
(0.108) 
0.076 
(0.104) 
0.078 
(0.109) 
Education 
0.032 
(0.044) 
0.037 
(0.045) 
0.035 
(0.041) 
0.026 
(0.041) 
Age 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
Management 
Experience in 
log 
-0.031 
(0.065) 
-0.035 
(0.062) 
-0.034 
(0.065) 
-0.051 
(0.066) 
Firm’s Attributes 
Age in log 
0.058 
(0.078) 
0.052 
(0.078) 
0.066 
(0.079) 
0.075 
(0.076) 
Return on Sales 
0.299 
(0.261) 
0.301 
(0.262) 
0.337 
(0.264) 
0.322 
(0.266) 
Number of 
Employees in 
log 
0.200*** 
(0.027) 
0.198*** 
(0.027) 
0.215*** 
(0.027) 
0.203*** 
(0.027) 
Access to Bank 
Loan 
0.153** 
(0.070) 
0.158** 
(0.070) 
0.157** 
(0.069) 
0.145** 
(0.069) 
Contextual Attributes 
Per Capita GDP 
in log 
-0.421** 
(0.210) 
-0.427** 
(0.210) 
-0.378* 
(0.209) 
-0.376* 
(0.207) 
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Note.  Former government employee is a dummy taking on value 1 if the respondent used to be 
an employee of a CCP or government institute, or of an SOE.  PC / PPCC delegates is a dummy 
taking on value 1 if the respondent is a PC or PPCC delegate in 2001.  CCP member is a dummy 
taking on value 1 if the respondent had joined CCP before she started her own business. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
3.1.2 R&D INVESTMENT DECISION 
We also run probit regressions of R&D investment decision using the same 
baseline specifications as those used for the general investment decision (Table 3).  
Now, none of the four measures of court quality appears significantly correlated 
with the R&D investment decision. 
 
Table 3 Probit Regressions of R&D Investment Decision: Base Results 
Lawyer Index 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.017 
(0.023) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
Marketization 
Index 
-0.004 
(0.060) 
-0.004 
(0.056) 
-0.023 
(0.056) 
-0.022 
(0.056) 
Constant 
-0.311 
(1.348) 
-0.359 
(1.358) 
-0.456 
(1.344) 
-0.362 
(1.342) 
N 2023 2016 2050 2011 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 Dependent Variable: DRD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
0.173 
(0.291) 
0.199 
(0.287) 
0.092 
(0.290) 
0.045 
(0.294) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
0.047 
(0.464) 
0.047 
(0.459) 
0.292 
(0.444) 
0.344 
(0.451) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
1.398 
(4.500) 
2.511 
(4.477) 
-0.899 
(4.512) 
-0.859 
(4.591) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
4.942 
(7.809) 
3.186 
(7.851) 
7.775 
(7.746) 
8.252 
(8.002) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
0.258*** 
(0.063) 
   
Former  0.224***   
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Note.  Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. The difference between the 
Pseudo R2 from these tests and those of general investment decisions above may be due to the 
missing data as discussed in the end of Part 4. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
Government 
Employee 
(0.069) 
PC / PPCC 
Delegates 
  
0.118* 
(0.065) 
 
CCP Member    
-0.000 
(0.067) 
Owner’s Attributes 
Gender 
0.101 
(0.083) 
0.142* 
(0.082) 
0.098 
(0.083) 
0.074 
(0.083) 
Education 
0.135*** 
(0.044) 
0.145*** 
(0.044) 
0.167*** 
(0.041) 
0.174*** 
(0.041) 
Age 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Management 
Experience in 
log 
0.059 
(0.055) 
0.055 
(0.055) 
0.027 
(0.051) 
0.027 
(0.051) 
Firm’s Attributes 
Age in log 
0.010 
(0.071) 
-0.001 
(0.071) 
-0.015 
(0.072) 
-0.001 
(0.074) 
Return on Sales 
0.134 
(0.224) 
0.112 
(0.226) 
0.204 
(0.229) 
0.230 
(0.245) 
Number of 
Employees in 
log 
0.225*** 
(0.028) 
0.227*** 
(0.028) 
0.216*** 
(0.029) 
0.230*** 
(0.029) 
Access to Bank 
Loan 
0.229*** 
(0.062) 
0.230*** 
(0.061) 
0.218*** 
(0.061) 
0.243*** 
(0.061) 
Contextual Attributes 
Per Capita GDP 
in log 
0.120 
(0.171) 
0.126 
(0.169) 
0.112 
(0.170) 
0.133 
(0.175) 
Lawyer Index 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.126 
(0.169) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
Marketization 
Index 
-0.124*** 
(0.047) 
-0.128*** 
(0.047) 
-0.130*** 
(0.047) 
-0.150*** 
(0.049) 
Constant 
-1.483 
(1.211) 
-1.801 
(1.209) 
-1.055 
(1.201) 
-1.012 
(1.208) 
N 2284 2274 2314 2264 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 
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 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
  
In Table 3, we see that three of the four proxies of entrepreneurs’ political 
connections show significant impact on their firms’ R&D investment decisions.  If 
the former cadre status is used again as the measure of political ties, then, for a 
firm with a noncadre male owner, without access to bank loans, headquartered in 
a medium or small city, in the manufacturing industry, and all the other variables 
having the mean values, its probability of making a positive R&D investment 
would rise by 7.25 percentage points (or 43%) had its owner been a cadre.33  The 
only proxy of political connections that does not exhibit significant effect on the 
R&D investment decision is the CCP membership.  This is consistent with our 
suspicion that the CCP membership is not a reliable measure of people’s political 
capital in China.  An ordinary CCP member does not seem to be better connected 
politically than a nonmember. 
Among the controls, the owner’s age is no longer a significant determinant of 
investment decisions, whilst her education level exerts significant influence on the 
R&D investment decision.  This result is not unexpected for a better educated 
entrepreneur will not only appreciate the importance of R&D more readily but 
also be abler to conduct R&D.  Echoing the previous literature (Lin et al. 2010), 
we find that firm size and access to bank loans show positive effects on a firm’s 
R&D investment decision.  With respect to the contextual attributes, the 
marketization index is inversely associated with the R&D investment decision, 
and is significant at 1% level.  This might be indicative of the negative effect of 
market competition on firms’ R&D incentives (Lin et al. 2010) in that competition 
should be more intensive where the transition toward market economy proceeds 
further. 
 
3.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
3.2.1 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Table 4 and Table 5 report the results when we add or remove certain control 
variables in the baseline regressions of, respectively, general and R&D investment 
decisions. 
In column (1) of these two tables, we add the owner’s membership in the 
most important and prestigious business association, the Industrial and Commerce 
Federation (ICF), for some scholar has pointed out the likely impact of the 
business association membership on firms’ investment strategies (Long 2010).  
The ICF membership does not appear to be significantly correlated with either the 
                                                        
33 The probability of a positive R&D investment for such a noncadre-owner firm is 16.68% while 
for a cadre-owner firm with otherwise the same attributes is 23.93%. 
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general or the R&D investment decision. 
Column (2) to (5) of Table 4 and Table 5 include different sets of firm level 
attributes not controlled in the baseline specifications.  Two additional indicators 
of firm performance, rate of sales growth and 1-year lagged return on sales, are 
added in column (2).  These controls also appeared in the previous research (Long 
2010; Lin et al. 2010).  Neither of these two factors affects firms’ general or R&D 
investment decisions with statistical significance. 
Column (3) controls two more financial features of the firms, leverage rate 
and initial access to bank loans.  Leverage rate was used in the literature to study 
private enterprise performance in China (Li et al. 2008), and the initial access to 
bank loans are controlled for its potential correlation with the firm’s access to 
bank loans in 2001.  Again, neither of these two controls has a significant effect 
on either type of investment decisions made by the private firms in China. 
Previous studies argue that private ownership, relative to state ownership, 
provides owners or managers with greater confidence in being shielded from 
government interference, and therefore encourages investment spending (Cull & 
Xu 2005: 132).  Ownership structure is also believed to bear on firms’ R&D 
investment since such investment impacts a firm’s social responsibility which is a 
major task of SOEs (Lin et al. 2010: 51).  While the firms studied in this paper are 
all privately owned, they are not necessarily solely owned by the entrepreneurs.  
Thus, we use the entrepreneur’s proportion of equity in the firm as an indicator of 
the firm’s ownership structure.  A higher rate of equity ownership by the 
entrepreneur may imply less serious agency problems, hence a higher proportion 
of return on investment reaped by the entrepreneur.  As a related issue, a firm’s 
internal decision-making mechanism is reflective of its ownership structure, and 
may affect its competence to reach timely investment decisions as well.  
Therefore, in column (4) we control the owner’s proportion of equity and whether 
the major decisions of the firm are made by the owner.  As Table 4 and Table 5 
demonstrate, the former does have a positive effect on the general investment 
decision as expected whereas the latter seems to be negatively associated with the 
R&D investment decision.  As for this latter finding, it is our conjecture that the 
entrepreneurs unwilling to delegate decision-making powers adopt more 
traditional and conservative business management strategies in general, thus are 
less interested in exploring new products or processes.  
In column (5), we add to the baseline model the amount of informal charges 
as a percentage of sales revenue paid by the firms in 2001.  This percentage is 
used as a proxy of government expropriation, a factor widely believed to 
discourage investment (Johnson et al. 2002; Cull & Xu 2005; Lin et al. 2010).  
However, the amount of informal charges reported in the private enterprise survey 
is perhaps not exactly the same as that of informal payments recorded in the 
World Bank surveys and relied on by the previous studies (Cull & Xu 2005; Lin et 
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al. 2010).  The original Chinese word of this informal charge, tanpai, can include 
the payments in kind but may refer only to the money paid to the government 
agencies, not the individual officials.34  It seems that the rate of informal charges 
does not have a significant effect on either type of investment decisions.35 
In column (6) of Table 4 and Table 5, we replace the provincial level 
contextual variables with the province dummies to control any province fixed 
effects not addressed in the baseline models.36  Finally, in column (7) we drop the 
two variables indicating the nonlocal court qualities as these variables might 
involve relatively higher multicollinearity, especially with the local court 
qualities.    
 
Table 4 Probit Regressions of General Investment Decision: Robustness 
Tests 
                                                        
34 The official definition of “tanpai” can be found in Art. 2 and 3 of “Jinzhi Xiang Qiye Tanpai 
Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Rules Prohibiting Apportionment of Charges in Enterprises]” enacted 
by the State Council in 1988.  
35  It should be noted that a substantial number of data are missing in this variable, so the 
conclusion should be treated with caution.  This is also why we do not include the rate of informal 
charges in the baseline specifications. 
36 We also replaced the provincial level per capita GDP with the increase of real GDP (in natural 
logarithm).  None of our major findings changed qualitatively, expect that the positive effect of 
quality of local courts in administrative litigations on general investment became significant at 
10% level when former government employee was used as the proxy of entrepreneurs’ political 
connections.  The regression results are available upon request. 
Dependent Variable: DIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
0.021 
(0.382) 
0.051 
(0.387) 
-0.134 
(0.394) 
0.099 
(0.381) 
0.369 
(0.427) 
0.239 
(0.338) 
0.083 
(0.264) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
1.272** 
(0.606) 
1.267** 
(0.606) 
1.028* 
(0.598) 
1.178** 
(0.598) 
1.574** 
(0.667) 
0.823 
(0.566) 
0.616* 
(0.368) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
-2.133 
(5.291) 
-0.541 
(5.300) 
-3.577 
(5.525) 
-2.472 
(5.323) 
-1.446 
(6.433) 
1.341 
(5.245) 
 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
14.705 
(11.150) 
15.373 
(11.095) 
10.424 
(11.144) 
15.523 
(11.199) 
18.758 
(12.842) 
8.774 
(10.463) 
 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
0.052 
(0.073) 
0.030 
(0.075) 
0.011 
(0.076) 
0.048 
(0.073) 
0.062 
(0.078) 
0.029 
(0.078) 
0.046 
(0.072) 
Additional 
Controls 
ICF 
member 
Sales 
growth 
Leverage 
rate, 
Proportion 
of owner’s 
Rate of 
informal 
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Note.  ICF is a dummy taking on value 1 if the owner is a member of the Industry and 
Commerce Federation.  Sales growth rate is the ratio of the increase in sales revenue in 2001 to the 
total sales revenue in 2000.   1-year lagged return on sales is the ratio of net profit to sales revenue 
in 2000.  Leverage rate is the amount of debt divided by the firm’s total assets.  Initial access to 
bank loan is a dummy taking on value 1 if the firm borrowed from a bank when it was established.  
Proportion of owner’s equity is the proportion of equity owned by the entrepreneur as of 2001.  
Major decisions by owner is a dummy taking on value 1 if the respondent chose the option 
“myself” in answering the survey question “Who makes the major business operation decisions in 
your firm?”.  Rate of informal charges is the ratio of the amount of informal charges paid by the 
firm to its sales revenue in 2001. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5 Probit Regressions of R&D Investment Decision: Robustness Tests 
rate, 1-
year 
lagged 
return on 
sales 
access to 
bank loan 
equity, 
major 
decisions 
by owner 
charges 
Province Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No Yes No 
Constant 
-0.351 
(1.345) 
-0.488 
(1.366) 
0.043 
(1.447) 
-0.731 
(1.366) 
-0.936 
(1.522) 
-0.873 
(1.308) 
-0.130 
(0.470) 
N 2023 1914 1801 1951 1504 1936 2023 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 
Dependent Variable: DRD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
0.181 
(0.292) 
0.235 
(0.300) 
0.137 
(0.311) 
0.218 
(0.294) 
0.153 
(0.345) 
0.218 
(0.299) 
0.099 
(0.206) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
0.015 
(0.467) 
0.188 
(0.496) 
-0.009 
(0.498) 
0.077 
(0.467) 
0.081 
(0.561) 
0.358 
(0.467) 
-0.173 
(0.338) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
1.530 
(4.530) 
2.941 
(4.529) 
0.216 
(4.693) 
1.901 
(4.452) 
-4.449 
(5.493) 
3.038 
(4.465) 
 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
4.657 
(7.942) 
8.615 
(8.040) 
4.481 
(8.625) 
4.008 
(8.130) 
8.905 
(10.944) 
0.556 
(6.237) 
 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.244*** 0.280*** 0.303*** 0.265*** 0.256*** 
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Note.  Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
In relation to the variables of our main interest, the effect of cadre status on 
R&D investment decision is robust in all specifications and the point estimate is 
consistent as well.  On the other hand, the influence of the quality of local court in 
administrative adjudication on general investment decision appears less robust.  It 
becomes less significant in some specifications and loses significance even at 
10% level when the province dummies are added to the regression.  Furthermore, 
the point estimate of this influence varies widely across different model 
specifications.  In unreported regressions, we replace cadre status with the other 
three proxies of political connections, as well as the alternative coding of cadre 
status including village cadres, and refit the seven models in Table 4 and Table 
5.37  Most of the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 38 
In the first two columns of Table 6, we added interactions between the court 
quality variables and entrepreneurs’ political connections to the baseline 
                                                        
37 We also run the baseline regressions using the revised coding of cadre status that includes 
village cadres, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
38 Like in Table 4, no matter which proxy of political connections is used, the local court quality in 
administrative adjudication is no longer a significant determinant of the general investment 
decision whenever the province dummies are added to the model, though the coefficient is positive 
in each regression.  As far as the R&D investment decision is concerned, when models (2) and (5) 
in Table 5 are refitted with PC / PPCC delegates as the proxy of political connections, the 
coefficients of this proxy remains positive but is no longer significant at 10% level.  In addition, 
CCP membership does not affect R&D investment decision.  Political connections show positive 
and significant impact on R&D investment decisions in all other specifications. 
(0.063) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.079) (0.065) (0.063) 
Additional 
Controls 
ICF 
member 
Sales 
growth 
rate, 1-
year 
lagged 
return on 
sales 
Leverage 
rate, 
access to 
bank loan 
Proportion 
of owner’s 
equity, 
major 
decisions 
by owner 
Rate of 
informal 
charges 
  
Province Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No Yes No 
Constant 
-1.539 
(1.230) 
-2.066 
(1.182) 
-1.385 
(1.239) 
-1.500 
(1.203) 
-0.168 
(1.351) 
-2.383** 
(1.167) 
-0.913** 
(0.378) 
N 2284 2152 2017 2190 1559 2284 2284 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 
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regressions.  However, in case of R&D investment, the main effect of political 
connections refers only to the limited situation where all court quality variables 
take 0 values, which rarely appears in practice.  Hence, we used following 
specification for R&D investment decisions to estimate the more interesting 
partial effect of political connections when the values of the court quality 
variables equal to their sample means (Wooldridge 2013): 
 
Yi = Pr (R&D investment dummy = 1) = f [α + βXi + γCi + δ(Xi – μ) × Ci + 
ηZi + εi]               (2) 
 
where f [] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) in the 
probit model; X is a vector of court quality variables with μ being the vector of 
their sample means, C is the entrepreneur’s political connections, and Z is a 
vector of other controls including owner, firm and contextual attributes. 
 
 Table 6 Probit Regressions with Interactions 
Dependent Variable DIN DRD DRD 
Quality of Local Court (ordinary) 
0.117 
(0.457) 
0.145 
(0.331) 
0.160 
(0.291) 
Quality of Local Court (administrative) 
0.954 
(0.659) 
0.014 
(0.569) 
0.057 
(0.469) 
Quality of Nonlocal Court (ordinary) 
-2.763 
(5.608) 
2.023 
(4.695) 
1.456 
(4.410) 
Quality of Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
13.562 
(11.474) 
4.843 
(8.111) 
5.029 
(7.680) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
-0.266 
(0.451) 
0.260*** 
(0.064) 
0.253*** 
(0.082) 
Owner’s Education Dummy   
0.174** 
(0.083) 
Interactions 
Quality of Local Court (ordinary) × 
Former Cadre 
-0.295 
(0.478) 
0.071 
(0.361) 
 
Quality of Local Court (administrative) 
× Former Cadre 
0.776 
(0.686) 
0.083 
(0.587) 
 
Quality of Nonlocal Court (ordinary) × 
Former Cadre 
0.590 
(1.321) 
-0.730 
(1.212) 
 
Quality of Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) × Former Cadre 
3.909 
(4.179) 
0.385 
(3.625) 
 
Owner’s Education Dummy × Former 
Cadre 
  
0.042 
(0.109) 
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N 2023 2284 2284 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.22 0.22 
Note.  Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects.  Main effects of political 
connections were estimated at zero value of court quality measures in the first model, and at 
sample means of court quality measures in the second model.  Owner’s education dummy equals 1 
if owner’s education level is college or higher, and 0 otherwise. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6 reveals that, as for general investment decision, the quality of local 
courts in administrative litigations has no statistically significant effect with 
respect to the firms whose owners are not politically connected (column 1).  
However, F-test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 10% level that 
both the main effect of the quality of local courts in administrative litigations and 
its interaction effect with owners’ political connections are zero.39  Furthermore, 
as presented in 3.2.3 below, when the sample is split into small and big firms, the 
local court quality in administrative litigations is highly significant for the former 
even in models with interaction terms.  The additional robustness check with 
interactions does not fully reject the effect of local court quality in handling 
administrative disputes.  On the other hand, the second column of Table 6 
reaffirmed the effect of political connections on R&D decision-making. 
The last column of Table replaced the 5-scale owners’ education level 
variable with a dummy measuring whether the owner had a college-or-higher 
level education (equal 1 if yes), and interact it with owners’ political connections.  
This is to further address the concern that the observed effect of political 
connections on R&D investment is actually caused by owners’ education 
attainment in that many Chinese officials are engineers by training and when they 
became private business owners their firms tended to be more technically 
sophisticated than those established by politically unconnected owners.  
Obviously, Table 6 rejects this possibility, and confirms the effect of political 
connections on firms’ R&D investment decisions. 
 
3.2.2 INVESTMENT INTENSITY 
Apart from the binary variables of investment decisions, we also run 
regressions of the continuous general and R&D investment intensities on 
measures of court quality, political connections, proxied by former cadre status, 
together with the baseline controls (Table 6).  The investment intensity is 
                                                        
39 This is robust even if alternative proxies of political connections are used.  Actually, the main 
effect of local court quality in administrative litigations is significant at 10% level when CCP 
membership is used as such a proxy. 
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measured in the basic specification by the amount of investment as percentages of 
total sales revenue (INOR and RDOR for general and R&D investment 
respectively).  We also report the results when the amount of investment as 
percentages of total assets, i.e. the sum of equity and liability, is used as an 
alternative dependent variable (INOA and RDOA for general and R&D 
investment respectively).  The investment-to-revenue or -assets ratio is left-
censored.  Even if a firm “wants” to make negative amounts of investment, it 
would not be able to – the minimum amount of investment is zero.  To avoid the 
bias of the OLS estimator when used for the censored data, this study employs the 
tobit model.  We made logarithm transformation of the data as explained above in 
order to reduce nonnormality, which causes biases in tobit estimates.40 
 
Table 7   Tobit Regressions of Investment Intensity 
Note.  INOR in log is natural logarithm of the amount of general investment as percentages of 
total sales revenue.  INOA in log is natural logarithm of the amount of general investment as 
                                                        
40 However, we still cannot eliminate the concern of heteroskedasticity, another source of bias in 
tobit models even after the data transformation.  In addition, the Censored Least Absolute 
Deviation (CLAD) model (Powell 1984) is not appropriate for this study as there are a large 
number of dummy variables in the model, and, with respect to the R&D investment intensity, the 
median value of the data is 0.  We did run OLS regressions with the same specifications, and the 
results, though not reported in the paper, are qualitatively similar.  Nevertheless, OLS estimates 
themselves may be biased for censored data.  Hence, the findings about the investment intensities 
are presented only as a robustness check, and should be treated with caution. 
Investment Type General R&D 
Dependent 
Variable 
INOR in log INOA in log RDOR in log RDOA in log 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
-0.061 
(1.032) 
-0.874 
(0.779) 
0.361 
(1.781) 
-0.646 
(1.452) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
3.012** 
(1.538) 
2.215** 
(1.149) 
-0.548 
(3.065) 
-0.421 
(2.673) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
-4.226 
(14.927) 
-15.147 
(10.779) 
10.615 
(30.373) 
-11.061 
(24.648) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
39.127 
(34.457) 
36.788 
(25.034) 
14.628 
(54.894) 
23.054 
(48.483) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
-0.005 
(0.197) 
-0.046 
(0.160) 
1.514*** 
(0.390) 
1.099*** 
(0.309) 
N 2026 1803 2284 2017 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 
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percentages of total assets.  RDOR in log is natural logarithm of the amount of R&D investment as 
percentages of total sales revenue.  RDOA in log is natural logarithm of the amount of R&D 
investment as percentages of total assets. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, the quality of local court in adjudicating 
administrative disputes has a positive and significant effect on the intensity of 
general investment, while the owner’s political connections positively and 
significantly affects the intensity of R&D investment, the same as what we have 
observed from the probit regressions.  Although not reported in the paper, we run 
the tobit regressions adding or removing controls as we did in section 3.2.1, and 
also replace cadre status with the other three proxies of political connections, as 
well as the alternative coding of cadre status, to refit these regressions.  The vast 
majority of the results are qualitatively the same. 41  
 
3.2.3 SPLIT-SAMPLE TESTS 
We split the sample based on the number of employees to test whether the 
relationships between court quality, political connections and investment 
decisions are different for firms of different sizes.  Table 8 reports the results of 
the probit regressions of investment decisions made by big and small firms.  Big 
firms are those with more than 60 full-time employees, the median of the 
employee number in the sample, whereas small firms refer to the firms with 60 or 
fewer full-time employees in 2001. 
 
Table 8 Probit Regressions of General Investment and R&D Investment 
Decisions: Split Sample 
                                                        
41 Whenever the province dummies are added or the nonlocal court quality controls are removed, 
the quality of local court in administrative adjudication becomes insignificant with respect to the 
intensity of general investment.  On the other hand, as for the intensity of R&D investment, 
whenever PC / PPCC delegates is used as the proxy of political connections, its coefficient is 
positive but loses significance in the regression of RDOR in log although it remains positive and 
significant at 5% or 1% level when RDOA in log is used as the measure of R&D investment 
intensity – with only one exception that loses significance at 10% level when the rate of informal 
charges is added.  Moreover, when interactions are added to the tobit regressions, the findings 
reported in the previous section do not change qualitatively. 
Dependent 
Variable 
DIN DRD 
Firm Size Small Big Small Big 
Quality of Local -0.316 0.469 0.031 0.677 
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Note.  Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
As can be discerned from Table 8, while the effect of the quality of local 
courts in administrative adjudication on general investment decision is significant 
only for the small firms, that of the cadre status on R&D investment decision is 
significant for both the small and the big firms though its magnitude is greater for 
the former.  The impact of political connections, however, is less robust with 
respect to big firms in general.  It is not significant when the PC / PPCC delegates 
or the alternative coding of cadres is used as the proxy of the owner’s political 
connections.  Interestingly, for big firms, nonlocal court quality in administrative 
litigations has positive impact on R&D investment decisions though the 
significance of the impact disappears when former government employee replaces 
cadre status as the proxy of political connections.  As for the small firms, it seems 
that even the quality of nonlocal court in deciding administrative disputes affects 
their general investment decisions.  Moreover, contrary to Cull & Xu (2005), we 
find that the access to bank loans has more significant effects on big firms’ 
investment decisions.42  Cull & Xu’s (2005) finding, however, appears less robust 
than ours.43  This might indicate a stronger tendency for small firms to rely on 
                                                        
42 As for general investment decisions, the positive effect of access to bank loan is significant, at 
10% level, only for big firms, whereas regarding R&D investment decisions, this effect is 
significant at 1% level for big firms but at 10% level for small firms. 
43 In Cull & Xu (2005), access to bank loan is significant at 10% level for small firms, but only 
when the collapsed sample (one observation per firm with all variables taking on average values) 
Court (ordinary) (0.503) (0.623) (0.430) (0.440) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
2.700*** 
(0.743) 
-0.746 
(0.917) 
-0.543 
(0.567) 
0.876 
(0.764) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
-6.913 
(6.590) 
3.627 
(9.917) 
-1.518 
(5.696) 
10.298 
(8.542) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
32.700** 
(13.410) 
-16.136 
(18.156) 
-11.869 
(10.230) 
29.730** 
(15.255) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
0.019 
(0.120) 
0.073 
(0.131) 
0.346*** 
(0.107) 
0.189** 
(0.086) 
N 955 1059 1135 1145 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.19 
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informal finance than big firms.  Since big firms make investments of much 
greater sizes than the small ones,44  informal finance, counting on family and 
friends, is less likely to be a sufficient source for these intensive investments 
(Cooter & Schäfer 2012). 
We also added the interactions between court quality and political 
connections to the split-sample regressions, the same as we did to the full sample 
ones.  Table 9 reports our findings. 
 
Table 9 Probit Regressions with Interactions: Split Sample 
                                                                                                                                                       
is used. 
44 In our sample, the average size of general investment by big firms is 4.96 million RMB yuan, 
about 5 times the average size of general investment by small firms.  With respect to R&D 
investments, the mean size for big firms is 1.26 million RMB yuan, more than 6 times the mean 
size for small firms.  
Dependent 
Variable 
DIN DRD 
Firm Size Small Big Small Big 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
-0.227 
(0.561) 
0.708 
(0.819) 
0.180 
(0.494) 
0.627 
(0.513) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
1.785** 
(0.773) 
-0.489 
(1.072) 
-0.826 
(0.716) 
0.953 
(0.858) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(ordinary) 
-5.800 
(7.142) 
-1.229 
(10.263) 
-0.977 
(5.868) 
11.225 
(8.742) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
33.465** 
(14.053) 
-19.354 
(18.652) 
-13.632 
(10.810) 
30.666** 
(15.456) 
Owner’s Political Connections 
Former Cadre 
0.501 
(0.645) 
-1.516** 
(0.721) 
0.342*** 
(0.105) 
0.200** 
(0.090) 
Interactions 
Quality of Local 
Court (ordinary) 
× Former Cadre 
-0.318 
(0.652) 
-0.746 
(0.761) 
-0.362 
(0.586) 
0.169 
(0.504) 
Quality of Local 
Court 
(administrative) 
× Former Cadre 
1.977*** 
(0.751) 
-0.420 
(1.026) 
0.545 
(0.760) 
-0.251 
(0.993) 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
-1.937 
(1.974) 
4.446** 
(2.154) 
-0.824 
(1.671) 
-1.231 
(1.818) 
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Note.  Robust standard errors clustered at the province-industry level are in parentheses.  All 
models include industry and headquarters location fixed effects.  Main effects of political 
connections were estimated at zero value of court quality measures in the first model, and at 
sample means of court quality measures in the second model. 
 *    Significant at 10%. 
 **  Significant at 5%. 
 *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 Table 9 shows that the main effects of court quality and political connections 
on both types of investment decisions are unchanged qualitatively even in models 
with interaction terms.45  The most noteworthy results in Table 9 is that, after 
interactions are added, the positive impact of the quality of local courts in 
administrative litigations remains significant for small firms but not for big ones.  
In fact, even the nonlocal court quality in this regard significantly affects small 
firms’ general investment decisions.  These effects are robust no matter which 
proxy is used for owners’ political ties.  The implications of these results will be 
further discussed in section 4 below.  On the other hand, the interaction effects 
between court quality and political ties are apparently complementary, but not 
robust to different measures of political ties.46  In passing, it is worth noting that 
although the main effect of political connections seems to be negative and 
significant on big firms’ general investment decisions, it only refers to the rare 
situation where all court quality measures take zero values.  When this effect was 
re-estimated for the more interesting case where all court quality variables take 
the value of their sample means, its statistical significance disappeared 
completely.  Hence, practically, court quality still exerts no influence on general 
investment decisions for big firms. 
 
                                                        
45 Similarly, the main effect of political connections on R&D investment decisions is less robust 
with regard to big firms.  It is not significant when the PC / PPCC delegates is used as the proxy of 
political ties.  Also, for big firms, the positive impact of nonlocal court quality in administrative 
litigations on R&D investment decisions loses significance when former government employee 
replaces cadre status as the proxy of political connections. 
46 As for small firms, the interaction effect is significant only when cadre status is used to proxy 
political connections whereas for big firms, the interaction effects lose significance when PC / 
PPCC delegates or CCP membership is used as the proxy of political ties. 
(ordinary) × 
Former Cadre 
Quality of 
Nonlocal Court 
(administrative) 
× Former Cadre 
-0.472 
(6.135) 
12.439 
(6.572)* 
2.346 
(5.638) 
-3.151 
(5.351) 
N 955 1059 1135 1145 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.19 
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3.2.4 OTHER ISSUES 
First, although the frequency of litigation has been often used as a proxy of 
court quality, some may argue that lack of litigation nevertheless reflects the 
superiority of the legal system.  Advocates of this argument posit that the 
predictability of the court system makes parties’ expectation about the outcomes 
of litigation converge, hence settlements out of court becoming more likely 
(Ramseyer 1988; Ramseyer & Nakazato 1989).  Despite its astuteness, this theory 
is not consistent with the more recent empirical evidence.  Even in the jurisdiction 
where the theory seems most relevant, Japan,47 people do become more active in 
litigation after the quality of the judicial system and legal service has improved 
(Ginsburg & Hoetker 2006).  Nevertheless, to address this concern, we include in 
our base regressions firms’ inclination to resolve disputes through negotiation as a 
proxy of the predictability of the legal system perceived by private enterprises.  
Civil and administrative disputes are distinguished and province-sector level 
aggregations are employed when we construct the variables of percentages of 
disputes usually resolved through negotiation by Chinese entrepreneurs, just like 
the variables indicating the percentages of litigation.48  None of the base results 
reported above changes qualitatively in these additional regressions. 
Second, the empirical findings in this research suggest a positive and 
significant correlation between owners’ political connections and firms’ R&D 
investment decisions.  Since we used owners’ pre-entrepreneurial career as 
measurements of their political connections, it is unlikely that the causal direction 
would go reversely from investment decisions to political connections.  However, 
some may suspect that this correlation is actually a consequence of the less risk-
adverse attitude held by the politically connected entrepreneurs compared to their 
unconnected counterparts.  To the extent that the politically connected have better 
employment options than the unconnected in China, it is possible that the former 
might be more risk-loving when they give up those less risky jobs and become 
entrepreneurs.  If this reasoning makes sense, however, ultimately entrepreneurs 
may have different risk attitudes not because of their difference in political status 
but in motivations to engage in entrepreneurship.  The literature on 
entrepreneurship explicitly distinguishes between “opportunity-based” and 
“necessity-based” entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al. 2002).  While opportunity-
based entrepreneurs are pulled to entrepreneurship to take advantage of potential 
business opportunities, necessity-based entrepreneurs are pushed to start their own 
businesses as other more satisfactory employment opportunities are absent.  
Previous studies also confirm that opportunity-based entrepreneurs are more risk 
                                                        
47 In fact, this theory was first used to explain the non-litigiousness of Japanese. 
48 The correlations between the litigation and negotiation propensities in dispute resolution, though 
statistically significant, are rather low.  For ordinary disputes, the correlation coefficient is -0.22, 
and the correlation coefficient is merely 0.09 for administrative disputes. 
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tolerant than entrepreneurs pushed by necessity (e.g. Bhola et al. 2006).  To 
address the confounding factor of risk attitude, therefore, we look to the 
motivations underlying people’s selection to be entrepreneurs in China. 
The 2002 private enterprise survey asks about the reason why the respondents 
started up their own businesses.  Seven options are provided for this question: 1) 
difficulty in handling the personal relationships in the original work unit; 2) 
unprofitability of the original work unit; 3) unemployment or laid-off; 4) to 
increase income; 5) for self-achievement; 6) encouraged by other people’s 
entrepreneurial experience; and 7) others.  Although these options are not strictly 
organized in line with the bifurcation of opportunity- versus necessity-based 
entrepreneurship, it seems reasonable to expect that those who chose the option of 
“for self-achievement” is more likely to be pulled by opportunities for 
entrepreneurship would not be viewed as a channel to self-achievement should it 
be the only, or the least unsatisfactory, employment choice to the respondent.  It is 
also plausible that those who strive for self-achievement tend to be more tolerant 
of risks in business activities.  On the other hand, the respondents choosing option 
3), unemployment or laid-off, were obviously pushed to entrepreneurship by 
necessity.  Accordingly, we construct two dummies, PUSH and PULL, taking on 
value 1 if the respondent chose option 3) or 5) respectively, and 0 otherwise.  We 
run regressions of R&D investment decision with these two dummies added to the 
baseline specification simultaneously and one after another.  The effect of owners’ 
political connections is significant in all these additional tests, and the dummy 
PULL demonstrates a positive effect, significant at 1% level, on R&D investment 
decisions but PUSH does not have any significant impact.  Due to the limit of 
space, the results of all the regressions mentioned in this subsection are not 
reported here but available upon request. 
In addition, we considered possible biases due to the cadre evaluation and 
promotion system. One may wonder if government officials are a chosen group 
with demonstrated faith in the stability of the regime and therefore more inclined 
to make long-term investments even after they have entered the business world. 
The CCP controls the vast state machine through a delicate cadre evaluation 
system. The system, however, is structured to incentivize local officials to 
implement important central policies. Local cadres are generally rewarded and 
promoted based on how well they meet specific performance targets, such as 
certain rate of GDP growth (Whiting 2004). Even at the top level, promotions are 
determined by factors other than faith and loyalty to the whole party regime (Shih 
etc. 2012). Thus, it is unlikely that the data are biased as a result of the cadre 
selection mechanism.        
Finally, we considered some potential self-report biases in the survey.  Most 
importantly, will Chinese entrepreneurs be ready to disclose their previous 
connection with the state?  While in the early years of “Reform and Opening Up”, 
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the official attitude toward private entrepreneurs had been adverse, or ambiguous 
at best, the atmosphere had apparently changed by the time the 2002 survey was 
conducted.  Jiang Zemin announced CCP’s official sanction of private business 
owners as “socialist constructors” in his address delivered on CCP’s 80th birthday 
in 2001.  Since then, the Party has been actively engaged in recruiting the wealthy 
business owners (Dickson 2003, 2008).  Against this political backdrop, we do not 
think that the surveyed entrepreneurs would systematically shy away from 
identifying themselves as Party members, former cadres or pubic employees, or 
PC / PPCC delegates. 
On the other hand, given the official nature of the surveys, politically 
connected entrepreneurs are arguably more inclined to choose a “politically 
correct” answer.  Investment in R&D may be considered as such an answer since 
the Chinese government has long advocated technological innovation, at least as 
its formal position.  Deng Xiaoping famously claimed in the 1980s that science 
and technology was the primary force of productivity.  Therefore, politically 
connected entrepreneurs might write down a greater number of expenditure on 
R&D investment simply to signal to surveyors their allegiance to the state 
authority.  In other words, the difference in R&D investment decisions could 
actually come from the respondents’ different attitudes toward answering survey 
questions in line with the government’s expectation.  Although there is no way to 
eliminate this possibility directly, in view of the findings in this research it does 
not appear to be a satisfactory explanation for the observed difference in 
propensities to invest in R&D between the politically connected and unconnected 
entrepreneurs.  If prior experience as a cadre or government employee has raised 
a respondent’s awareness of catering for an officially sanctioned position, then we 
should reasonably expect that current CCP members would have shared such 
awareness to much the same, if not a higher, degree because these are no less 
salient tags of political insiders who are supposed to be loyal to the Party 
mandate. Thus they should also have been more ready, than the entrepreneurs 
without these identities, to display eagerness for R&D investment.  But this 
expectation is not borne out by our data.49 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
So far most scholars relying on the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 
data report that the quality of the formal legal system positively affect Chinese 
                                                        
49 In addition, the proxy of PC / PPCC delegates is less significant than former cadre status or 
government employment in most specification in light of its effect on R&D investment decision 
although, like CCP membership, it is a strong indication of an entrepreneur’s current political 
affiliation.  This further substantiates that the observed disparity in firms’ inclination to make R&D 
investment is not merely a result of the respondents’ bias in answering survey questions. 
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firms’ investment either generally or particularly in R&D.  Hence, they believe 
that China is no exception to the broad literature on law and development 
underscoring the importance of a well-functioning legal system to economic 
growth (Long 2010; Cull & Xu 2005; Lin et al. 2010).  Our findings in this 
research, however, cast some doubt on this mainstream proposition.  The 
empirical results drawn on the Chinese private enterprises seem to be closer to the 
minority view that challenges the applicability of the law-finance-growth nexus to 
the private sector in China (Allen et al. 2005). 
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this paper is that the legal and political 
factors may bring about different implications for Chinese firms’ decisions on 
general and R&D investments.  We submit that this difference is probably a result 
of the disparate nature of these two types of investments.  While the return on 
R&D expenses is usually achievable in a relatively long period of time, in China 
most other investments can be made in projects capable of bringing returns 
quickly.  In other words, firms are more likely to care about the long-run property 
rights security when investing in R&D, but only look for the possibility to reap 
quick profits in making most other investment decisions.  
R&D is widely considered as an important long-term investment involving an 
extended life span before returns can be materialized through successful 
commercialization (e.g. Lin et al. 2010; Long 2010).  To ascertain the different 
length of time horizons underlying the general and R&D investment decisions, we 
divide the firms into two groups based on whether they recruited external rating 
agencies to make a credit rating in 2001.  The dummy variable RATE equals 1 if a 
firm did so.  We assume that firms having a good credit history and intending to 
take advantage of it in future financing are more likely to pay for credit ratings, 
and that such firms should have a longer time horizon when determining their 
business strategies.  When added to the baseline probit regressions of general and 
R&D investment decisions respectively, this dummy is positive and significant at 
1% level only in the regression of R&D.  These results lend support to our 
proposition that the R&D investment involves a long-term planning which is 
unseen in the general investment decisions of Chinese private enterprises. 
Considering their difference in time horizon, the two types of investment 
decisions studied in this paper may count on varied levels of property rights 
security.  When returns are expectable within a short period of time, the risk of 
expropriation appears less severe as the investor may be able to wrap up the 
profits promptly before expropriation actually occurs.  Hence, investors will be 
ready to invest insofar as some elementary certainty of property rights can be 
guaranteed such as a relatively hassle-free procedure to make investments and 
collect returns.  As the life cycle of an investment extends, however, it becomes 
harder to conceal its contents and profitability from outsiders.  So chances are 
higher that the fruits of the investment could be stolen or taken.  Accordingly, an 
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advanced level of security is required to prevent expropriation by those who have 
such a capacity. 
The formal legal institution in China might be able to provide a lower level of 
security needed for short-term investments.  Nevertheless, the uncertainty 
embedded in a judiciary lack of independence disturbs investors with a longer 
time horizon.  The flip-flops in judicial policies usually are consequences of the 
variations of the broad political and ideological orientation, as well as the personal 
preferences of those in charge of the judiciary (Fu and Cullen 2011; Minzner 
2011).  Therefore, an alternative arrangement is necessary to assure the investors 
of a higher level of security that is indispensible for long-term investments like 
R&D.  In the current Party state, connections with powerful political figures 
provide this second-tier security not available in the official judicial system.  
Because private companies operate in a transitional system where formal 
institutions generally lag behind social and economic changes, many business 
activities may be considered borderline illegal (Parris 1993).  So even if the courts 
are powerful and independent enough to strictly enforce the law, private 
entrepreneurs may feel better off seeking alternative protection.  In the general 
environment where every business breaks some law, security is best obtained from 
those who decide whether or how to enforce the law, i.e., powerful government 
officials.  In addition, political connections protect private entrepreneurs from 
“central policy instability and ideological hostility”(Wank 1996).  For many 
reasons national laws and policies are passed with detrimental effects on local 
business practices. Strong ties with the local enforcers will insulate the companies 
from those effects, or at least afford the companies a comfortable cushion.  
Political connections also ensure the enforcement of contract and help the 
companies obtain scarce resources allocated by the local government (Xin and 
Pearce 1996; Han and Pannell 1999; Li and Zhang 2007).  This two-tier theory of 
property rights security explains why the quality of the formal legal system might 
have an impact on the general investment while it is the owner’s political 
connections that facilitate the R&D investment. 
To have a close look at the first-tier protection awarded by courts, we 
distinguish the judicial quality in civil adjudications from that in administrative 
adjudications.  We find that if the quality of the formal legal system has any 
effect, it is courts’ ability to constrain government agencies in administrative cases 
that promotes investment by the private firms.  This finding is readily 
understandable in view of the studies exploring the role of informal social 
arrangements as a replacement of the formal institutions (Macaulay 1963; 
Ellickson 1994; Greif 1989, 1993).  In particular, Allen et al. (2005) claim 
reputation and relationships being the most important alternative financing and 
governance mechanisms in China’s private sector. 
Whereas the informal mechanisms can function smoothly between business 
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partners or private market agents with frequent interactions, they may not work 
equally well when market agents are in dispute with regulators.  Self-enforcing 
strategies, like tit-for-tat, seems useful only between private parties on a par with 
each other in terms of their accessibility to coercive state power, but cannot be 
counted on to handle the conflicts between a private agent and the state itself.  It is 
much harder for private players in the market to impose meaningful penalties on 
government agencies when the latter behave opportunistically to pursue their own 
interests.  In essence, informal mechanisms are less effective to ensure the 
creditability of the commitments made by the state.  Personal relationship with 
government officials is probably a primary informal channel to guard against 
property right violation by government agencies.  However, as to be explained 
below, it can be more costly to stay under the aegis of the politically powerful 
than to resort to legal recourse.  Consequently, to private investors, the formal 
legal safeguard against state intervention is more critical than its function in 
sanctioning property rights between private parties. 
A question remains why political connections do not boost the incentive to 
make general, likely short-term, investments among the private entrepreneurs in 
China.  We believe that a possible answer lies in the cost of tapping into political 
resources.  In China, where business and politics are of a symbiotic relationship 
(Wank 1996; Xin and Pearce 1996; Dickson 2007), at least two significant costs 
arise when private investors attempt to seek endorsement by the politically 
powerful.  First of all, a substantial amount of rents must be paid in exchange for 
the selective protection provided by the powerful figures (Haber et al. 2003).  
From their perspective, the rents, net of the cost of offering protection, cannot be 
lower than the net benefit they will derive from indulging right infringement by 
government agencies.  The rent will be especially high when investors compete 
for political favoritism. 
Less apparent, but equally important, is the cost incurred to identify the 
reliable source of political influence.  To the extent that political rent-seeking is 
illegal, or at least infamous, it will be kept secret from the public (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1993).  Instead, a set of “latent rules” governs this hidden practice 
unknown to the general investors.  Consequently, the information cost is 
significant as investors search for favorable treatment through political 
connections.  At the same time, those in power also need to be assured of the 
trustworthiness of their patronage, a cost priced eventually into the amount of 
rents.  In this respect, former cadres and other insiders of the political institution 
may have certain information advantage in general, but that advantage does not 
guarantee low searching costs for them to prevail in every particular situation. 
When added up, the various costs involved in recruiting right protection 
through political ties are likely to be even higher than the expenses of litigation.  
Of course, rational investors should compare the costs of tapping into the political 
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connections with the benefit from doing so with respect to each type of 
investments.  Where the security of property rights is less demanding for 
investment projects, they may also be more willing to rely on the less expensive 
recourse.  Therefore, effective as it might be, political influence is less preferred 
as a mechanism of right protection in term of short-term investments.  In passing, 
it is important to note the difference between the informal cooperation between 
private business partners and the informal protection acquired through political 
connections in that the former usually generates surplus by lowering the 
transaction costs while the latter involves rent-seeking inherently at the sacrifice 
of efficiency.  Therefore, private parties may opt out of an otherwise effective 
judicial system to handle their disputes informally (Macaulay 1963; Ellickson 
1994, Cooter & Schäfer 2012), but few will turn to political connections should 
the formal legal system provide a sufficient recourse. 
Finally, as the split sample tests suggest, for bigger firms, both the quality of 
legal system and the owner’s political connections become weaker determinants 
of investment decisions, either qualitatively or quantitatively.  The implication of 
this finding might be that bigger firms have additional channels to rein in 
government opportunism not available to the smaller ones.  Presumably, big firms 
have stronger leverage over governments, especially at the local level, as the main 
source of tax revenue and employment.  Governments, therefore, are more 
hesitant to impair the security of the property rights of these firms even without 
the constraints by an independent judiciary or influence from powerful figures 
connected to the firm owners. 50   It is particularly impressive to find that the 
quality of both local and nonlocal courts in handing administrative disputes plays 
the most significant role in the general investment decisions of smaller firms 
whose owners are not politically connected.  Indeed, without political ties or over 
leverage over government, these firms are conceivable in the greatest need of 
legal protection of their property rights. 
In short, although our findings are at odds with those in the previous studies 
reporting straightforwardly the impact of legal institutions on investment 
incentives, they do not have to contradict the broad property rights theory in the 
law and development scholarship.  Instead, it presents more complicated 
connections between legal and political institutions, both formal and informal, as 
they are employed to safeguard property rights.  Investors reckon the benefits as 
well as costs while choosing among the available mechanisms to optimally 
guarantee the security of their investments, just like what they do in making any 
business decision.  When it is too costly to protect the property rights essential to 
                                                        
50 However, the positive effect of nonlocal court quality in administrative litigations on big firms’ 
R&D investment decisions might indicate a limit in these firms’ additional leverage over nonlocal 
governments, thus the effectiveness of the formal judicial system rises in importance to business 
activities outside the firms’ home provinces. 
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a certain type of investment, investors simply choose to stay away from it. 
One caveat is in order though.  As explained in the data description, more 
data points are missing with respect to the general investment decisions, arguably 
reflecting the respondents’ deeper reluctance to disclose the relevant information 
to the surveyor.  Hence, there might be greater measurement errors associated 
with this independent variable.  So the results about the general investment 
decisions should be assessed with more caution. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
China has often been used as a counter-example to the asserted causal link 
between effective legal system and economic development.  Skeptics of the 
causality point to the weak property rights protection in China and its remarkable 
growth over the past three decades.  Recent studies, however, find a way to 
reconcile the Chinese case with the general theory.  At an early stage of 
development when legal institutions are underdeveloped, informal institutions fill 
the gap by providing security to investment and reducing transaction cost.  But 
when the scale and sophistication of the economy has reached to a high level, 
legal institutions will be more efficient in facilitating growth than informal 
institutions.  
Based on a large-scale survey of private entrepreneurs, our empirical research 
finds a new relationship between institutions (formal and informal) and business 
investment.  Consistent with the conventional view, a more effective legal system 
is correlated with more general investment made by private companies.  But 
among the major aspects of an effective judiciary, we find the legal restraint over 
the state to have the most important effect on short-term investment by private 
companies.  The effect, however, diminishes when private entrepreneurs consider 
making long-term investment, and political connections replace courts to be the 
more important factor, i.e., entrepreneurs with better political ties invest more in 
R&D.  The finding suggests that Chinese courts, in spite of decades of reform, are 
not yet viewed as reliable to protect long-term private investment from 
expropriation, policy instability, and a hostile regulatory environment.  Rather, 
informal political connections constitute the premise for the protection of longer-
term investment.  We also find evidence that political ties are expensive resources 
to accumulate and maintain, so Chinese entrepreneurs tap into them only when 
substantial long-term interests are at stake.       
Our findings and tentative explanations open the door for more interesting 
and important research questions.  First, further research is needed to understand 
what kind of political connections provide property rights protections.  Officials, 
especially those in powerful positions, move relatively frequently in the system.  
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How do political ties continue to be effective when the patron has moved to other 
positions or locations? We hypothesize that entrepreneurs with relatively 
immobile investment will build political connections with multiple power-holders 
to hedge the risk, but such hypothesis awaits empirical tests. Second, how 
efficient is political connections in protecting property rights and facilitating trade 
and long-term investment?  Do entrepreneurs make the same long-term 
investment under the protection of political connections as under legal protection?  
It will be helpful to collect R&D investment data that vary according to the 
expected time of return and test the effect of political connections on that variable.  
If identical investments are made under the two institutions (law and political 
connections) and for the same long-term, we would have to re-examine the 
conventional view about law and development.  Third, how will changes in the 
two types of institutions interact?  “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.”  Capitalists 
have long occupied a prominent place in the studies of democratization and other 
political changes.  As in law and development, China poses a challenge to the 
conventional view in the sense that Chinese entrepreneurs have failed to form a 
unified force behind political reforms.  Will those with political connections 
oppose legal reforms so they can maintain their competitive advantages?  Future 
studies are needed to answer these questions. 
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